


Telephone: (04) 527-5767
DtelN: (347) 7767
Fax: (04) 527-5777



NGATI TUMATAUENGA

Capability, Analysis and
Doctrine Branch
Army General Staff
Trentham Military Camp
P.O. Box 905
UPPER HUTT

File No CAD 2510/1

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MODELLING PATROL SURVIVABILITY IN A GENERIC PEACEKEEPING SETTING

Reference(s):

A. DOTSE REPORT 177- NR 1358 – ISSN 1174-3387

1. With the increase of New Zealand Army participation in a widening role of Peace Support Operations DOTSE, as part of an Operational Effectiveness study, produced the report at Reference A. The aim of this particular study was to explore how risk to peacekeepers varies as the behaviours of the local's change.
2. The Executive Summary to Reference A details the main findings of the study and observes that the main determiners of risk to a peacekeeping patrol where the potential foes outnumber the peacekeepers is the belligerents disposition towards the peacekeepers.
3. This model amplifies the importance, in a PSO environment, of the ability to maintain superior situational awareness through intelligence. In this environment the value of HUMANINT cannot be underestimated in order to assess and maintain the mood of the belligerents.
4. The main military finding of this model relates to perception. In essence a well disciplined and trained war fighting patrol with robust rules of engagement stood the best chance of success while minimising blue force casualties. This war-fighting stance instils a sense of primal fear in the belligerents that ensures a reluctance to cluster and gain enough courage to confront the patrol.
5. The corollary to this is an over reaction from a patrol may invoke a fanatical type response that then threatens the patrol. The insight from this is the potential strategic impacts of decisions by patrols in PSO operations. Commanders at all levels must be well trained to not only conduct operations in accordance with the ROE but understand the strategic impact of abusing the ROE.

6. The model highlights that PSO is about perceptions. The greater the ability to shape the belligerents perception, the greater the chance of success. The role of information operations is paramount in these shaping operation. Information operations not only shape the belligerents perception but also limit their ability to shape the local populations perceptions of the Peacekeepers. Again the HUMNINT role to monitor this is imperative.

7. The report shows the danger of the belligerents to cluster and conduct operations once the perception of vulnerability is identified. In order to concentrate the model found they belligerents required communications to be effective. The deduction from this factor tends towards a capability that would prohibit belligerent communications once the peacekeeping patrol is deemed vulnerable.

8. In reviewing the findings of the enclosed DOTSE report the following insights are deduced:

- a. The ability to shape belligerents perceptions is important to achieving mission success in PSO;
- b. A war-fighting force instils a sense of primal fear in belligerents and this assists in achieving mission success;
- c. ROE must be robust enough to support the perception of war-fighters;
- d. Commanders at all levels in PSO operations must be cognisant of the strategic implications of decisions at the tactical level;
- e. Information operations need to be understood and practised in the NZDF to assist in achieving mission success in PSO; and
- f. The ability to interfere with the belligerents ability to communicate assisted mission success and minimised blue force casualties.

D.L. BAIGENT
Lieutenant Colonel
ACGS CAD

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Enclosure:

- 1. DOTSE Report 177 (Reference A)

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